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The unique nature of the Internet highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be
subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states
that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed.
Typically, states' jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography, however,
is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet.
We are leaving one era and entering another. In the earlier, romantic era, the
hope and belief was that geography would prove "a virtually meaningless con-
struct on the Internet." In the newer more legalistic era,2 geographic sovereigns
are putting into place a large and rapidly expanding number of rules that target
Internet behavior.3 In the romantic era, there were brave declarations that "the
Internet treats censorship as damage, and routes around it," or "national borders
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1. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
2. The word "era" was traditionally used to describe one of the five major divisions of geologic
time. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 769 (1986). In "Internet time," an era can last
only a few years, perhaps less.
3. In one week in July 1998, the U.S. Senate considered legislation that would: (1) require
filtering software on computers in schools and libraries that get federal funds for Internet hookups;
(2) make it a crime for commercial websites to distribute or display to minors any material that
could be "harmful" to children; (3) give the Federal Bureau of Investigation access to the customer
records of Internet service providers in investigations of pedophilia without an order from a court
or grand jury; and (4) make it criminal to gamble over the Internet. Jeri Clausing, Senate's Internet
Legislation Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1998, at D5.
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aren't even speed bumps on the Information Superhighway." 4 In the newer era,
a CompuServe executive in Germany can be sentenced to jail for failing to filter
out material objectionable to a Bavarian prosecutor. 5 And, as discussed in this
article, the European Union (EU) might consider most commercial websites in
the United States to be governed by its new privacy rules.6
For this symposium on Jurisdiction and the Internet, this article pursues three
overlapping tasks. The first task is to go beyond jurisdiction by exploring choice
of law issues. For many modern transactions, multiple sovereigns will have
personal jurisdiction based on the significant activity within their borders. Conse-
quently, even where jurisdiction exists, there is the additional important question
of determining when a sovereign will impose its own rule, or instead choose to
have the law of a different sovereign govern. In order to provide a baseline
understanding of the subject, Part I presents an introduction to choice of law
rules within the European Union (EU) and discusses the framework for choice
of law in transactions involving both the European Union and the United States.
The second task of the article is to explore how choice of law rules will operate
for an emerging area of law with important implications for the Internet. In
October 1998, the European Union Directive on Data Protection (Data Protection
Directive) entered into effect.7 The discussion of this privacy Data Protection
Directive will draw on research undertaken for a book entitled None of Your
Business: World Data Flows, Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy
Directive.8 Part II of this article provides an overview of the Directive. The
Directive harmonizes, to an unprecedented extent, the laws regulating the use
of personal data. Such harmonization offers one alternative to choice of law rules,
for there is obviously no need to choose if all the rules are the same. On closer
inspection, however, such harmonization is far from complete. The European
Union has created elaborate and largely nonjudicial mechanisms for resolving
the remaining problems. Part II analyzes the resultant choice of law regime. It
also critiques proposals to understand this regime to expand EU jurisdiction to
a vast range of websites in the United States and around the world. Part II
4. E-mail from Timothy C. May to the e-mail listserv, owner-cypherpunks@toad.com (Feb.
13, 1997) (on file with the author). E-mail from JohnYoung to the e-mail listserv, cypherpunks@toad.-
com (Apr. 5, 1998) (on file with the author). For a leading academic expression of the romantic
position, see David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law And Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
5. Morning Briefcase, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 29, 1998, at 2D (describing suspended
two-year prison sentence received by the former head of CompuServe Corp's German unit for allowing
distribution of pornography on the Internet through the company's network).
6. See infra notes 94 to 117.
7. Council Directive 95/46, 1995 0. J. (L281) 31 [hereinafter Directive 95/46, available in
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en >.
8. PETER P. SwIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS,
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE (1998) [hereinafter SwIRE &
LITAN].
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concludes by applying the choice of law rules of the Data Protection Directive
and the EU Distance Selling Directive9 to sample transactions.
The third task of the article is to explore more generally when and whether
legal regulation of the Internet is likely to be effective. As a normative matter,
dueling fears exist about over-regulation and under-regulation. The fear of over-
regulation, expressed by the court in Pataki, is "that a single actor might be
subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation
by states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were
being accessed."' 0 The contrary fear of under-regulation is that important social
harms might take place over the Internet unless governments enforce strict laws
prohibiting such behavior. In fact, as discussed in Part III, every sovereign has
identified some actions over the Internet that it considers harmful enough to
deserve regulation. Sovereigns differ enormously, however, in which actions
they consider harmful. A related problem is that multiple sovereigns will often
have jurisdiction over a potential defendant, and choice of law issues will inevita-
bly arise in determining which sovereign's rules should apply in a given instance.
Part III suggests the metaphor of "elephants" and "mice" for understanding
when legal regulation of the Internet is most likely to be effective. In brief,
elephants are large organizations that have major operations in a country. Ele-
phants are powerful and have a thick skin, but are impossible to hide. They are
undoubtedly subject to a country's jurisdiction. Once legislation is enacted, they
likely will have to comply. By contrast, mice are small and mobile actors, such
as pornography sites or copyright violators, that can reopen immediately after
being kicked off of a server or can move offshore. Mice breed annoyingly
quickly-new sites can open at any time. Where harm over the Internet is caused
by mice, hidden in crannies in the network, traditional legal enforcement is more
difficult. In such instances legal enforcement, to be successful, will focus on
someone other than the mice themselves. Candidates for enforcement include
the individual users, the Internet service providers, the financial intermediaries
that transfer money to the mice, and the offshore countries that provide the mice
a cozy nest. By exploring the metaphor of the elephants and the mice, we develop
a sense of how choice of law and legal regulation are likely to develop for the
Internet.
I. Choice of Law in the European Union
The choice of law regime in the European Union is complex." The goal in
this article is to introduce some of the main components and begin to see how
9. Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the
Protection of Consumers in respect of Distance Contracts [hereinafter Distance Selling Directive],
available in <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24/policy/developments/dist-sell/index-en.html >.
10. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 168-69.
11. See generally MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE
THROUGH THE JUNGLE (1995) [hereinafter Reimann].
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the rules apply to Internet transactions. The complexity results, in good measure,
from the different levels of authority that purport to govern choice of law rules.
Rules can be set at the national or even sub-national level, in bilateral agreements,
as a matter of EU law, or in multilateral conventions. Quite often, the rules
created in these various fora themselves conflict. Choice of law must clarify
which of the apparently relevant rules govern in a particular context. In re-
searching choice of law, the traditional starting place would be the national law
of the sovereign whose court is hearing a dispute. For instance, an English court
might first turn to English choice of law rules in addressing a contract or tort
dispute. Over time, however, countries have entered into some important multilat-
eral conventions to harmonize choice of law rules, such as the Rome Convention
discussed below. 2 These conventions, once adopted by a country, typically take
precedence over preexisting national choice of law rules.
In researching European choice of law, it is not enough to research only national
rules and bilateral or multilateral agreements. As discussed in Part II, in connec-
tion with the Data Protection Directive, regulation by the European Union applies
directly to the member states. Where the European Union acts through a Directive,
the member states are required to enact implementing legislation. Choice of law
rules in such legislation, which must comply with the Directive, take precedence
over preexisting national law.
Amidst this complexity, there is a persistent drive for harmonization. Over
time, the European Union has expanded from six original members to the present
fifteen. The depth of economic and political integration has also steadily increased,
culminating with both the political union embodied in the Treaty on European
Union signed at Maastricht in 19923 and with the introduction of the Euro as a
transnational currency. Continued harmonization of choice of law rules is a next
logical step in the creation of Europe's unified internal market. The proliferation
of international transactions involving the Internet will provide a further impetus
for such harmonization.
A. THE ROME CONVENTION
A key document for harmonizing choice of laws in Europe is the European
Community Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations,1
4
commonly known as the Rome Convention. The Rome Convention, by its terms,
applies to "contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between
the laws of different countries." 5 In practice, important limitations exist on its
12. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1 [herein-
after Rome Convention]. See generally RICHARD PLENDER, THE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS CONVEN-
TION: THE ROME CONVENTION ON THE CHOICE OF LAW FOR CONTRACTS (1991).
13. Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C224) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 247 (1992).
14. Rome Convention, supra note 12.
15. Id. art. 1(1).
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general applicability. First, the Rome Convention does not take precedence over
choice of law rules that are included in EU legislation. 6 The discussion below of
the Data Protection Directive illustrates how EU law is often now the authoritative
source for choice of law in many settings. Second, the Rome Convention does
not apply where a member state has joined an international convention on a
certain topic.' 7 A prominent example, discussed below, is the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,18 which governs
many sales of goods involving the United States and an EU Member State. 9 The
convention also exempts from coverage certain substantive areas, including wills
and succession,2 ° domestic relations,2' commercial paper,22 corporate law,23 and
trusts.2 4 These substantive areas, however, are mostly covered by other interna-
tional agreements that help supply uniform choice of law rules.25
Contracting parties are generally free to designate whatever law they wish,
even if it is the law of a country not bound by the Rome Convention.26 Predictably,
this broad principle has important limitations. For instance, parties cannot avoid
the mandatory rules of a country if all parts of the contract are closely connected
to that country.27 Suppose a landlord rents an apartment to a tenant in England.
Both parties live in England and the apartment is in England, but the lease provides
that French law applies. In such a case, the tenant would benefit from any manda-
tory rules under English law, notwithstanding the usual Rome Convention princi-
ple of freedom of choice.28
Consumer contracts are another important exception to the freedom of contrac-
tual parties to choose the applicable law. 29 The consumer exception to the Rome
Convention applies to a contract for goods or services (or a contract for credit
16. Id. art. 20.
17. Id. art. 21.
18. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 3 I.L.M. 668
(1980) [hereinafter CISGI.
19. For a recent critique of the Rome Convention, see H. Matthew Horlacher, Note, The Rome
Convention and the German Paradigm: Forecasting the Demise of the European Convention on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (1994).
20. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. l(2)(b).
21. Id.
22. Id. art. 1(2)(c).
23. Id. art. l(2)(e).
24. Id. art. l(2)(g).
25. See, e.g., The Geneva Convention on the Law Applicable to Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, June 7, 1930, 143 L.N.T.S. 257; The Geneva Convention on the Law Applicable to Cheques,
Mar. 19, 1931, 143 L.N.T.S. 355.
26. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. 2. The parties are also free to choose a law for a
certain portion of the contract. Id. art. 3(1).
27. Id. art 3(3).
28. Id. art. 7(1).
29. Id. art. 5. For an excellent compilation of the way that European Union consumer law has
effected French contract law, see Jerome Huet, European Community Sources of French Contract
Law, 5 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 85, 86 (1997). For general discussion of European consumer
law, see VIVIENNE KENDALL, EC CONSUMER LAW (1995).
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for those goods or services) where the consumer acts as a private person outside
of his or her "trade or profession." 30 In such cases, individuals will receive the
protection offered consumers in the country of their habitual residence31 provided
that: (1) the contract was the result of advertising or an invitation of the person
providing goods or services (vendor); (2) the vendor received the consumer's
order in the consumer's country; or (3) the vendor arranged for the consumer
to come to the vendor's country to complete the contract.32 In other situations,
the consumer transaction will still be governed by the Rome Convention. Con-
sider, for instance, a consumer who lives in England, but buys property in France
under a contract that calls for application of Belgian law. The consumer might
expect to receive the protection of English law, if the contract were the result
of advertising or one of the other listed criteria. English consumer laws would
not apply, however, because the consumer exception applies to goods and ser-
vices, but not to land. The general freedom-of-choice principle of the Rome
Convention would dictate use of Belgian law.
Where the Rome Convention does apply, but there is no express choice-of-law
provision, the court will look to see if the parties' implied choice has been "dem-
onstrated with reasonable certainty. ,33 If no choice can be implied with reasonable
certainty, then the court will apply the law of the country with which the contract
is most "closely connected." 3 4 A contract is presumed to be most closely con-
nected: (1) to the country of residence of an individual effectuating performance,
or (2) to the location of central administration for a business effectuating perfor-
mance.35 For example, where the contract contains no choice of law provision,
and a company in England buys widgets from a company in France, French law
will govern.36 If the contract is for real property, then in the absence of a choice
of law provision the law of the country where the property is located is presumed.37
Any of these presumptions can be overridden if it appears, for whatever reason,
that the contract is most closely connected with another country.38
B. THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
Although the Rome Convention governs choice of law for contracts between
Member States of the European Union, the United States is not a signatory.
30. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. 5(1).
31. Id. art. 5(2).
32. Id.
33. Id. art. 3(1).
34. Id. art. 4(1).
35. Id. art. 4(2).
36. Note, however, that the outcome would be different if the widgets were bought for personal
use and the consumer exception to the Rome Convention applied. In that situation, as discussed
above, French law would be overridden by relevant, mandatory provisions of English consumer
law. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. 5.
37. Id. art. 4(3).
38. ld. art. 4(5).
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However, many contracts involving Europe and the United States are governed
by the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 39
which the United States has signed. By the terms of the Rome Convention, the
CISG takes precedence when the two conflict.'
The CISG applies to contracting parties who have their places of business in
different states, when both states are signatories of the CISG. 41 For instance, if
a company in the United States agrees to buy widgets from a company in England,
the CISG would govern the contract on whichever side of the Atlantic that suit
was ultimately brought. At least in theory, the CISG provides significant stability
in the law of international sales. The CISG goes beyond the choice-of-law ap-
proach of the Rome Convention and endeavors to supply substantive rules to
govern a contract.42
The scope of the CISG, however, is limited in important respects. First, the
CISG applies only to the sale of goods 43 and not to any contract as the Rome
Convention does. 44 Second, the CISG contains a very large exclusion; it does
not apply to sales of goods bought for "personal, family or household use,"
namely consumer goods.45 Consumer contracts are typically governed by the
choice of law provisions of the consumer's home country; in practice, this means
that consumers also often receive the protections of their home country's substan-
tive law. Next, the CISG does not apply to negotiable instruments, stocks,
shares,46 situations where the buyer is supplying a substantial amount of the parts
necessary to make the good,47 or situations where a substantial part of the contract
is for services.48 Nor does the CISG apply to any personal injury or death caused
by the goods.49 The CISG is not concerned with the validity of the contract or
the title of the goods sold.50 Finally, the CISG can be excluded from application
by an agreement of the parties.5
39. CISG, supra note 18.
40. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. 21.
41. CISG, supra note 18, art. 1(1). In the United States, it does not apply when one contracting
party has its place of business in the U.S. and the other has its place of business in a non-signing
state. Article I (1)(b) states that the CISG would apply if the rules of private international law would
lead to application of the signor state's law, but the United States has opted out of that provision
in accordance with Article 95.
42. The preamble to the CISG states, "BEING OF THE OPINION that the adoption of uniform
rules which govern contracts for the international sale of goods and take into account the different
social, economic and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international
trade and promote the development of international trade." CISG, supra note 18, at 671.
43. Id. art. 1(1).
44. Rome Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(1).
45. CISG, supra note 18, art. 2(a).
46. Id. art. 2(d).
47. Id. art. 3(1).
48. Id. art. 3(2).
49. Id. art. 5.
50. Id. art. 4.
51. Id. art. 6.
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C. CHOICE OF LAW IN TORTS
Originally, the Rome Convention was meant to include noncontractual obliga-
tions as well as contractual ones. 52 Due to the influence of the United Kingdom,
however, noncontractual obligations were dropped from its scope.53 Individual
countries have been left to set their own choice of law rules for torts. Conflicts
are reduced because most of the countries of the European Union follow the
same rule, that of lex loci delicti, or the law of the place where the tort was
committed.54 However, disagreements can arise, such as when the act and the
harm occur in different places. For example, if a company in England puts up
a website that defames a person in France, what law is to be applied? The answer
will depend on the choice of law rule where the suit is brought because the
countries of the European Union are split as to whether the place of the act or
the place of the harm is used to determine the applicable law.55
II. The European Union Directive on Data Protection
The brief summary of European choice of law rules provides a sense of the
incomplete harmonization in the current international regime for choice of laws.
Specialized rules exist for different sorts of transactions. Even within the Euro-
pean Union, special choice of law rules often exist as provided by EU law.
Part II examines the EU Data Protection Directive, both as an example of a
specialized choice of law regime and as new law that will apply to many Internet
transactions. The Directive illustrates both the potential and the limitations of
harmonization as a way to avoid choice of law problems. It also illustrates the
leading role played by networks of administrative agencies, rather than judicial
decisions, in the development of international choice of law.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DIRECTIVE
The European Union Data Protection Directive (Directive) was adopted in
1995 and took effect on October 25, 1998. The Directive is sweeping in scope,
applying to all "processing" of "personal data," with only limited exceptions.56
Processing is a broad term that means "any operation or set of operations which
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means." 57 Personal
52. The EEC Draft of a Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual and Non-Contractual
Obligations, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 584 (1973).
53. See Paul Lagarde, The European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions: An Apologia, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 92 (1981).
54. REIMANN, supra note 11, at 135.
55. Id. For citations to U.S. discussion of digital defamation, see Michael Hadley, Note, The
Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477, 478 n. 11 (1998).
56. Directive 95/46, supra note 7, arts. 2 & 3. See generally SwiRE & LITAN, supra note 8,
ch. 2.
57. Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 2(b).
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data is a similarly broad term, meaning "any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person ('data subject')." 58
Pursuant to the Directive, each EU Member State must adopt a strict privacy
law that provides clear rights to data subjects. When collecting information from
an individual, those processing data (individuals known as the "controllers")
must disclose their identities, their purposes for processing, and other informa-
tion.5 9 Data can only be processed for the announced purposes, 6° contrary to the
common U.S. practice of permitting a company to use personal data for unlimited
purposes. Before data can be provided to third parties for direct marketing, the
individual must be informed and have the right to opt out free of charge. 6' Those
processing personal data must guarantee that individuals have access to their own
personal data and the opportunity to correct that data. 62 Other rules apply, such
as special restrictions on the processing of sensitive data, including information
about racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, or the processing of data concern-
ing health or sex life.63
In considering enforcement of these rights, it is vital to recognize that the
Directive does not itself apply to any behavior; instead, the Directive requires
each EU Member State to promulgate a law that complies with the Directive's
terms. Actual enforcement will thus take place under the law of a particular
Member State. 64 Each country must establish one or more data protection agen-
cies, known as "supervisory authorities," to help implement privacy rights.
Supervisory authorities are required to have investigative powers, "effective
powers of intervention," and the power to engage in legal proceedings or to
bring violations to the attention of judicial authorities.65
In practice, supervisory authorities have usually worked informally with con-
trollers when complaints are filed. In many instances, the controller explains
why the practice in fact complies with applicable standards or else agrees to
modify the objectionable practice. This non-litigation approach is likely to pre-
dominate under the Directive as well. Nonetheless, more formal sanctions have
been and will be used under national laws, including ordering the erasure of data
58. Id. art. 2(a). The Directive does not, however, apply to processing of personal data "by a
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity." Id. art. 3(2).
59. See id. art. 10.
60. See id. art. 6(1)(b).
61. See id. art. 14(b).
62. See id. art. 12.
63. See id. art. 8(1).
64. If a member state does not enact such a law, then a suit could ultimately be brought in the
European Court of Justice to require such enactment.
65. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 28(3). The Directive gives examples of "effective
powers of intervention," such as "delivering opinions before processing operations are carried
out" and "ensuring appropriate publication of such opinions, of ordering the blocking, erasure or
destruction of data, of imposing a temporary or definitive ban on processing, of warning or admon-
ishing the controller, or that of referring the matter to national parliaments or other political institu-
tions." Id.
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and bans on transfers of data to jurisdictions with weak or nonexistent privacy
laws.66 In addition to administrative remedies, Member States are required to
provide to every person the right to ajudicial remedy for breach of privacy rights.67
Article 25 of the Directive, governing transfers of data out of the European Union,
has drawn special attention. Article 25 allows transfers to third countries (i.e.,
Non-Member States) only if the third country ensures an "adequate" level of
protection.6 Although the meaning of "adequacy" will only be clarified with
time, many European officials believe that the United States lacks adequate protec-
tion, at least for some important sectors.
Where there is not adequate protection, flows of personal information from
Europe to the United States would be permitted only under one of the derogations
(exceptions) in article 26. One important exception is when the data subject has
given consent unambiguously in advance of the transfer. 69 Another is where the
transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract, such as providing the
name and address for shipping a purchase into Europe. 70 A different type of
exception is where a supervisory authority believes there are "adequate safe-
guards" of privacy, such as where the transfer takes place under a contract that
ensures that European-style rules will apply in the third country.7 Unless one
of the derogations is satisfied, transfers of personal data are not permitted to
countries that lack adequate privacy protection.72
B. THE LEVEL OF HARMONIZATION UNDER THE DIRECTIVE
The Directive is a major step toward harmonizing data protection law, both
within the European Union and around the world. At the same time, as discussed
here, there are significant constraints on the degree of harmonization. Because
of these constraints, choice-of-law problems can easily arise under the Directive.
By understanding the nature of these choice-of-law problems for flows of personal
66. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Restrictions on International
Data Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995).
67. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 22.
68. Adequacy is assessed "in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer
operation or set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of
the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country
of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in
the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied
with in that country." Id. art. 25(2). For extensive analysis of the adequacy of protection in the
United States, see SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 8, ch. 2(a).
69. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 26(1)(a).
70. See id. art. 26(l)(b).
71. See id. art. 26(2). The contractual approach is discussed at length in SWIRE & LITAN, supra
note 8, chs. 3 & 8.
72. A principal task of the SwiRe & LITAN book, supra note 8, is to explore the implications
and policy aspects of the article 25 requirement of "adequacy" and the possible consequent limits
on transfers of personal data out of the European Union.
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data, more general insights will be gained about legal regulation of data flows
on the Internet.
Before adoption of the Directive, European data protection laws had important
areas of both similarity and dissimilarity. Privacy laws have spread gradually
since 1970 when the German state of Hesse enacted the first data protection
statute.73 As Professor Fred Cate has discussed, European data protection laws
generally have had four features:
[T]ypically they apply to both public and private sectors; they apply to a wide range
of activities, including data collection, storage, use, and dissemination; they impose
affirmative obligations (often including registration with national authorities of any-
one wishing to engage in any of these activities); and they have few, if any, sectoral
limitations.
74
By the early 1990s, a large fraction of EU members had adopted national
legislation containing these features. Beyond the broad similarities, however,
the national laws exhibited some notable differences. For instance, the French
National Commission on Informatics and Freedoms, known as the CNIL for its
French abbreviation, has powers that at least in theory are as sweeping as its
title. Companies processing a wide range of personal information are expected
to register their proposed data processing with the CNIL, and the agency has
significant powers to deny the proposed processing. The CNIL not only has broad
powers over data protection, but has separate subcommissions on freedom to
work, research and statistics, local government, and technology and security.75
On a quite different model, German data protection law assigns responsibility
for data protection to both state and national officials. The Data Protection Com-
missioners at both levels are expected to play an important advisory role, mobiliz-
ing public support and urging private and public entities to be cautious in their
uses of personal information. Other European national laws have fallen between
the French "regulatory" data protection system and the German "advisory"
system. Moreover, as of 1990, Italy, Greece, Spain, and other European nations
had not yet promulgated a national data protection statute.
The terms of the Directive were drafted and debated during the early 1990s,
and adopted formally in 1995. (As discussed in more detail elsewhere, this timing
meant that the drafters paid little attention to special problems arising from the
Internet.)7 6 The Directive is designed to further the creation of a unified market
in Europe.77 It is intended to prevent the sort of dispute that erupted in the late
1980s, when France threatened to ban flows of personal information between
Fiat's operations in France and those in Italy, which had no national data protection
73. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 32 (1997).
74. Id. at 32-33.
75. Id. See DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FED-
ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 182-239 (1989).
76. See SwIRE & LITAN, supra note 8, ch. 3.
77. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, at 31-32 (findings (1) to (9)).
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statute.78 Under the Directive, all Member States are understood to have a strong
level of protection of personal information. Thus, the general rule, subject to
choice of law limitations discussed below, is that personal data can be sent or
processed within the entire European Union on the same terms as within a Member
State.
The Directive undoubtedly increases the level of harmonization within the
European Union by requiring every Member State to create a data protection
agency and implement detailed statutes. In some significant, but difficult to mea-
sure way, passage of the Directive has also put pressure on other countries to
adopt similar legislation. 79 A wide range of countries with extensive trade relations
with the European Union might be found to lack adequate protection of privacy
and thus might encounter limits on the transfers of personal information. The
last few years have seen data protection laws enacted or seriously considered in
European countries outside of the European Union and in far-flung countries
such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and New Zealand. ° In conversations with
persons knowledgeable about these developments, it is clear that the Directive
has played a prominent role in encouraging such legislation. The possible finding
of inadequate protection has also been used as an argument for enacting new
privacy legislation in the United States."1
Although the Directive has led to significant convergence in data protection
laws, harmonization is far from complete. Actual enforcement does not take
place under the Directive itself. Instead, national laws are being enacted to imple-
ment the Directive.82 These laws will differ in both large and small ways from
each other. The level of enforcement effort will also undoubtedly vary by country,
due both to differences in views about proper policy and differing levels of
enforcement resources and experience. Two notable areas where differences are
likely to develop involve sensitive data and authorization for transfers to countries
outside of the European Union.
"Sensitive" data is defined in article 8 as "personal data revealing racial or
78. See Schwartz, supra note 66, at 491-92. In the particular dispute, Fiat-France eventually
entered into a contract with Fiat-Italy, which required Fiat-Italy to offer the protection of French
law to the information once it was transferred to Italy.
79. For an insightful discussion of convergence in data protection regimes, see Colin Bennett,
Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policy for the Protection of Personal Data, in TECHNOLOGY
AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
80. See Privacy and Human Rights (visited Oct. 21, 1998) <http://www.gilc.org/privacy/
survey >.
81. See, e.g., Marc Rotenberg, Speech in Brussels, Belgium entitled Privacy and the Citizen
in the Digital Age: The Era of Political Action (Oct. 17, 1996) ("Some believe that we need a privacy
agency to address the concerns raised in Europe by the application of the data directive to North
America. This is not correct. We need a privacy agency to answer the concerns of consumers in
the United States."). A copy of this speech may be accessed at <http://epic.org/staff/rotenberg/
speech-brussels_10_96.html >.
82. Data protection laws, decisions of data protection agencies, and a wide range of other legal and
policy material relevant to the Directive will be collected at <http://www.privacyexchange.org >.
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ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life." The
general provisions of article 8 are quite strict, banning all processing of sensitive
data except in enumerated circumstances such as receiving "explicit consent"
for processing from the individual. s3 Moreover, several provisions in article 8
allow the Member State to set even stricter rules. For instance, Member States
can provide that even with "explicit consent" they will not allow processing of
categories of sensitive data.1
4
The potential lack of harmonization on sensitive data may have more far-
reaching implications than appear at first glance. The reason is that some sensitive
data might be included in an enormous range of databases. For example, human
resources records might easily include information about health insurance or
trade-union membership. Credit card records and other payment information
might reveal purchases of pharmaceuticals or other health-related purchases.
Purchases from book stores, visits to web pages, or subscriptions to periodicals
might reveal political opinions or religious affiliation. In all of these instances, a
routine method for processing data, which otherwise complies with the Directive,
might be subject to non-harmonized national laws that prohibit such processing.
Organizations that design their systems for the ordinary case might not have an
infrastructure in place to process sensitive data legally.5
Another potentially important area involving a lack of harmonization is article
26, which creates the derogations (exceptions) that permit transfers of personal
information to countries that lack adequate protection. Article 26(1) creates six
derogations that allow transfers, such as where the individual has given unambigu-
ous consent or the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract. These
exceptions apply, however, "save where otherwise provided by domestic law
governing particular cases.',8 6 The Member States thus retain the discretion to
nullify or limit the important exceptions, which are being counted on by many
organizations to permit transfers, after the Directive went into effect in October
1998.
For data that does not fit within the exceptions in article 26(1), transfers may
be legal under article 26(2) where "adequate safeguards" exist and a Member
State authorizes the transfer. Major efforts are currently underway to design
83. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 8(2)(a).
84. Id. Member states can also set special rules in areas such as: processing of data by a health
professional; creation of additional exceptions for reasons of substantial public interest; release of
data relating to "offences, criminal convictions or security measures"; processing of data relating
to administrative sanctions or civil trials; and conditions under which a national identification number
or any other identifier of general application may be processed. See id. arts. 8(3)-(7).
85. As of the fall of 1998, American Airline was under a data embargo in Sweden not to transfer
sensitive airline reservation data to the United States, including health data (e.g., wheelchair for a
passenger) or ethnic origin (e.g., kosher food or no pork for Muslims). SwiRE & LITAN, supra note
8, at 133.
86. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 26(1).
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model contracts that would be considered "adequate safeguards."- 87 Decisions
about adequacy, however, are likely to be made at the national level. 88 Some
nations may not provide for approvals at all under article 26(2). As national laws
to implement the Directive are put into final form, other areas will also emerge
that lack harmonization. One example is in the scope of the definition of "personal
data" in article 2, and especially the meaning of "identifiable data." New re-
search by Professors Joel Reidenberg and Paul Schwartz reveals a significant
number of such differences, and more will emerge with time.
89
C. THE DIRECTIVE'S REGIME FOR CHOICE OF LAW AND HARMONIZATION
In light of the significant lack of harmonization that persists under the Directive,
it becomes important to study the mechanisms for resolving differences in EU
national data protection laws. The Directive provides three procedural mecha-
nisms to assist harmonization: (1) revision of the Directive, (2) the "Working
Party" of national experts, (3) and the so-called "Comitology" process of voting
at the EU level. After examining these mechanisms, the discussion will turn to
the explicit choice of law regime in article 4 of the Directive. Careful attention
will also be given to the claim, advanced by some European officials, that article
4 greatly expands the jurisdiction of EU members over many websites in the
United States and around the world.
1. Procedures for Harmonization
To the extent national differences persist in EU data protection law, in violation
of the goal of encouraging a unified internal market, one solution is revision of
the Directive over time. Article 33 explicitly contemplates such a process. The
Commission is required to report on the implementation of the Directive no later
87. The author is working with one such effort, headed by Dr. Alan Westin and the Center for
Social and Legal Research. The use of model contracts is discussed at length in SWIRE & LITAN,
supra note 8, ch. 8. The Working Party and European officials generally have shown a greater
willingness over time to consider a constructive role for the contractual approach. Compare Working
Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, European
Commission First Orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries-Possible Ways
Forward in Assessing Adequacy (visited June 26, 1997) <http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/
d5020en2.htm> (saying contractual approach should only "rarely" be used), with Working Party
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, Preliminary Views
on the Use of Contractual Provisions in the Context of Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries
(visited Apr. 22, 1998) < http://www.open.gov.uk/dpr/500598pa.htm > (showing greater willing-
ness to consider use of contracts, especially for large international networks and where the parties
to the transactions have affiliates in Europe) [hereinafter Working Party].
88. It is possible that decisions about standard contractual clauses will be made at the EU level,
as provided by article 26(4). See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 26(4). Interviews with European
officials suggest that such harmonization is unlikely to occur at the early stages of use of contractual
provisions.
89. Telephone interview with Professor Joel R. Reidenberg (July 26, 1998). The Reidenberg and
Schwartz research was prepared for Directorate Generale 15 of the European Commission, and the
written version was not public as of press time. See generally < http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg 15/en >.
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than October 2001, along with suitable proposals for amendments if necessary.
In particular, the Commission's report is supposed to examine potential applica-
tion of the Directive to the data processing of sound and image data, which is
outside the scope of the current Directive. In doing so, the Commission must
take account "of developments in information technology and in the light of the
state of progress in the information society. ' ' 90
A major force for harmonization is likely to be the "Working Party on the Protec-
tion of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data" (Working
Party), created by article 29. The Working Party is composed of a representative
of the supervisory authority or authorities for each Member State, along with a
representative of the Commission and a representative for any authority or authori-
ties established for European Community institutions. The principal task of the
Working Party is to render expert advice on matters arising under the Directive. 9'
Although its actions are entirely advisory, the Working Party is nonetheless
likely to be influential on data protection issues. The Working Party has already
issued a number of widely-read reports on specific topics. 92 Additionally, national
data protection agencies may act in agreement with such reports, especially con-
sidering their participation in drafting such reports. As national laws are written,
national legislators might also adopt the position of the Working Party, both
out of deference for the members' expertise and because of the convenience of
following recommendations agreed upon at the EU level.
For questions of determining adequacy, this advisory process is supplemented
by a binding, or "Comitology" process set forth in article 31. Suppose that, in
an enforcement proceeding in one country, there is a determination that the United
States, or a sector in the United States, lacks adequate protection. This finding
of inadequacy could then be appealed to the article 31 Committee. The Committee
would be chaired by a representative of the European Commission, who would
submit to the Committee a draft of measures to be taken. The Member States
would then vote on the proposal in Committee according to a weighted system
in which larger countries have a greater vote. The national representatives to
this Committee would be political appointees, and not necessarily data protection
officials. After the vote, the Commission would adopt measures that would apply
immediately. 93
90. See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 33.
91. Specifically, the Working Party shall give the Commission an opinion on the level of protection
in the Community and in third countries, give an opinion on codes of conduct drawn up at the
Community level, and advise the Commission on any proposed amendment to the Directive. Its
opinions and recommendations on specific matters are also forwarded to the Commission and to the
Committee, described below, that is formed under article 31. Id. art. 31.
92. Many actions of the Working Party are posted at the web site of the Directorate General
XV, at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en>.
93. If the Commission's measures are not in accordance with the opinion of the Committee, the
Commission shall defer application of the measures for three months. During that time, the Council
of the EU, acting by qualified majority, may take a different decision. A slightly different procedure
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2. Article 4: Strict and Perhaps Tres Strict
The Directive's rules for choice of law (and perhaps for jurisdiction) are laid
out in article 4.94 To date, there has not been any authoritative guidance on the
interpretation of article 4. The views expressed here are based on my personal
reading of the text of article 4, informed by conversations with knowledgeable
officials, scholars, and others.
The interpretation of article 4 begins with two terms of art. The first term is
the "controller," which means the person "which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data." 95 The
second term is a "processor," which means a natural or legal person "which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller." 96 To get a sense of how
the two terms operate, imagine a bank that contracts out the handing of certain
back-office operations to a data processing company. The bank would be the
controller, because it is in charge and determines the purposes of the data pro-
cessing. The outside contractor would be a mere processor under the Directive
and would act on behalf of the controller.
The basic rule under article 4 is that each Member State shall apply its own
data protection laws where "the processing is carried out in the context of the
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member
State." 97 Under this language, French law would apply to a controller established
on French territory. By contrast, French law would apparently not apply to a
applies for situations under article 26(2), where a Member State authorizes a contract or other
safeguard as adequate for transfer to a country that otherwise lacks adequate protection. Member
States are required to inform the Commission and the other Member States of authorizations they
grant under article 26(2). See Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 26(2). If a Member State or the
Commission objects on justified grounds, the Commission shall take appropriate measures under
the Comitology process just described. Id.
94. The rules for choice of law provide:
1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to the processing of personal data where:
(a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment
of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the same controller
is established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the necessary
measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations
laid down by the national law applicable;
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State's territory, but in a place
where its national law applies by virtue of international public law;
(c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of
processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated
on the territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for
purposes of transit through the territory of the Community.
2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 (c), the controller must designate
a representative established in the territory of that Member State, without prejudice
to legal actions which could be initiated against the controller himself.
Id. art. 4.
95. Id. art. 2(d).
96. Id. art. 2(e).
97. See id. art. 4(l)(a).
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processor established on French territory if the controller were established in
another Member State.
Things get trickier when the same controller is established on the territory of
several Member States, such as where one company has operations throughout
the European Union. In such cases, the rule appears to be that of the narrowest
funnel-the controller must apparently comply with the strictest of the various
laws that might be applicable. In the language of the Directive, the controller
"must take the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments
complies with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable." 98
These intra-European Union situations are straightforward, however, com-
pared with the problems that can arise where the controller is in a third country,
that is, outside of the European Union. The Directive provides that a Member
State shall apply its own law where "the controller is not established on Commu-
nity territory and, for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equip-
ment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State,
unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory
of the Community." 99 This language has potentially sweeping implications con-
cerning choice of law and jurisdiction, especially for websites in the United States
and around the world. It raises difficult interpretive issues concerning the meaning
of "makes use of equipment." An intriguing wrinkle is that the "makes use of
equipment" language may have a significantly different meaning in the French
and some other language versions of the Directive.
A straightforward reading of the text creates a choice of law rule that a Member
State's law will apply wherever: (1) the controller is not established on Community
territory, and (2) the controller makes use of equipment in the Member State
(for more than mere transit). On this reading, article 4 does not alter a country's
jurisdiction. If there is otherwise jurisdiction over the distant controller, and an
action is brought in an EU state, then article 4 provides the choice of law rule.
For reasons that will become apparent, I believe this to be an appropriate interpre-
tation of article 4.
A more ambitious, and legally questionable, reading of article 4 would find
that it speaks not only to choice of law, but to personal jurisdiction as well. To
see this point, posit a backdrop of existing jurisprudence for personal jurisdiction
in France, England, and other EU nations. Next, posit the existence of websites
in the United States and elsewhere in the world that would not be subjected to
European jurisdiction under the existing jurisprudence. Such websites are likely
98. Id. A different interpretation, raised in some conversations with European officials, would
stress the singular in the term "national law applicable." Under this alternative interpretation, there
would apparently be only one applicable law. The choice of law task would then be to determine
the unique applicable law that applies. If this interpretation were adopted, then the Directive would
require a potentially substantial new jurisprudence of how to select that unique law in the huge range
of circumstances to which the Directive applies.
99. Id. art. 4(l)(c) (emphasis added).
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to be extremely numerous, likely including operations that have no assets in
Europe and that make no targeted solicitation to European customers. Indeed,
others have highlighted the limits on jurisdiction over foreign sites even under
the unusually sweeping jurisdiction jurisprudence of the United States.'t°
The surprising nature of the claim that article 4 expands the jurisdiction of
European data protection law is clear. As just discussed, there would apparently
be a category of U.S. websites that would not ordinarily come under the jurisdic-
tion of European law. Now, however, under article 4 of the Data Protection
Directive and implementing legislation in the Member States, these sites would
suddenly be brought within the jurisdiction of European law for their data pro-
cessing activities. This substantial expansion of the reach of EU law would not
have taken place through a publicized or negotiated effort to expand jurisdiction
law generally. Instead, the expansion would have taken place in a provision of
a specialized Directive, without any mention of the term jurisdiction. Further-
more, the expansion of personal jurisdiction to websites around the world would
take place through a Directive drafted in the early 1990s, before there was any
significant deliberation about the nature of the Internet or how to regulate it.' 0 '
This jurisdiction-enhancing view of article 4 is no idle fancy. In an August
1998 meeting, a well-informed EU official answered a question concerning the
application of the Directive to U.S. websites. The topic is apparently the subject
of ongoing discussion among data protection officials, and may be the subject
of a forthcoming Working Party paper. The official specifically mentioned article
4, stating: "[t]he general feeling is that the Directive would apply, especially
in situations where the data are actively collected by the site." 02 Depending on
the meaning of "actively collected," such a view might readily sweep most
commercial U.S. websites into the reach of the Directive. 1
03
Assessing the merit of the jurisdiction-enhancing view in part depends on the
definition of when a controller "for purposes of processing personal data makes
use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of said Mem-
100. Jack Goldsmith, What Internet Gambling Legislation Teaches about Internet Regulation, 32
INT'L LAW. 1115 (1998); Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace,
32 INT'L LAW. 1167 (1998).
101. To date, interviews with European officials have not revealed any legal basis, outside of
the text of article 4 itself, for claiming that the Directive expands the jurisdiction otherwise applying
to websites or other controllers established outside of the EU. That is, there has been no mention
of any other authority in European Union law that would authorize such a result.
102. The statement was made on condition that the speaker not be identified.
103. The European official did not define what was meant by "active collection" of data. It seems
quite possible, though, that the use of cookies, which are used by many U.S. web sites, would count
as "active collection." Cookies are pieces of code that web sites can send to a user's hard drive.
They can be used to help the site collect and collate personal information about the user. See < http://
www.junkbusters.com > (discussing "How Web Servers' Cookies Threaten Your Privacy"). Under
the argument that article 4 expands EU jurisdiction, if cookies were to be considered "active collec-
tion" of data, then many or most U.S. commercial websites would be included within the scope of
the Directive.
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ber State." Consider a possible interpretation that is consistent with the plain
English of the text and avoids the jurisdiction-expanding view discussed above.
Under this interpretation, the provision would apply whenever the controller has
equipment situated in the territory of the Member State. On this view, if controllers
or their agents own or lease equipment in France, then French data protection
law would apply. Such equipment could include items used by employees or
agents in their French offices or during business trips to the country. Equipment
used by processors, on behalf of controllers, could also qualify. By contrast,
article 4 would not apply simply because a French resident surfed to a U.S.
website. In such an instance, the controller may have no prior contact with France
and so would not have "made use of equipment" in France.
This possible interpretation mentioned the "plain English of the text." The
"plain French" is potentially significantly different. Rather than mentioning
"makes use of equipment," the French text would apply national law wherever
the controller has recourse "a des moyens" ("to any means") situated in the
territory of the Member State.'4 The German and Italian versions may be more
similar to the French than the English version.'05 The French version is echoed
by the English version of recital twenty preceding the Directive, which states
that "the processing should be governed by the law of the Member State in which
the means used are located."
Under the French text, there is a stronger argument that article 4 applies to
the U.S. website. A controller would have recourse "to any means" in France
when the French individual uses the Internet. As argued by French and other
data protection officials, these "means" could include the French individual's
computer and the French telecommunications system that sends data from France
to the U.S. website. 106
Although the French text provides some support for the jurisdiction-enhancing
view, a legal question exists as to whether, as a matter of EU law, a directive
can order the member states to expand the reach of their jurisdiction. In other
words, is it within EU competence to require expansion of jurisdiction? To date,
officials personally interviewed by the author have not identified any legal basis
for the view that a directive can do so.
104. The French text of article 4(l)(c) applies the law of the member state where: "c) le responsable
du traitement n'est pas 6tabli sur le territoire de la Communaut6 et recourt, A des fins de traitement
de donnds A caract6re personnel, A des moyens, automatis6s ou non, situds sur le territoire dudit
Etat membre, sauf si ces moyens ne sont utilis~s qu'A des fins de transit sur le territoire de la
Communaut6." For the full French text of the Directive, see <http://www2.echo.lu/legal/fr/
dataprot/directiv/direct.html >.
105. E-mail from Giusella Finocchiar to CyberProf@mail.law.utexas.edu (Jan. 22, 1998) (on file
with author). E-mail from Joel Reidenberg to CyberProf@mail.law.utexas.edu (Jan. 21, 1998) (on
file with the auhor). The Italian version discusses the "strumenti" available in the member state,
which perhaps falls between the English "equipment" and the French "moyens" (means). See
< http://www2.echo.lu/legal/it/datipers/direttiv/direttiv.htmI >.
106. This position was taken by French and other officials whodiscussed the meaning of the Directive
with me "on background" during the course of researching SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 8.
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Even if it is legally permissible for a directive to require expansion of
jurisdiction, the next question is whether article 4 creates such a requirement.
There are multiple and weighty arguments against a jurisdiction-enhancing
view that relies on the French text. First, as a formal matter, both English
and French are official languages of the European Union, so there is no basis
for claiming that the French text is privileged over the English text. Second,
the French text can be sensibly interpreted in the way suggested here for the
English text. The French text states that the controller must have recourse to
any means in the Member State. If the controller has done nothing to control
anything in France, and quite possibly does not even know a user is coming
from France, then the controller may not have played an active enough role
over any means in France to fit within the definition. Third, even if a U.S.
website were to fit within the definition, article 4 quite possibly should be
considered as a choice-of-law provision rather than a jurisdiction-enhancing
provision. In other words, article 4 would be read to say that French law
would apply if, and only if, personal jurisdiction exists over the website based
on ordinary principles of jurisdiction law.
Finally, as a policy matter, there are serious concerns about greatly expanding
personal jurisdiction through article 4. Objections were mentioned about the
adoption process of article 4, namely the absence of a publicized debate to broadly
expand jurisdiction law, the inclusion of major reforms in a specialized Directive
without any mention of the term jurisdiction, and the major implications for legal
regulation of the Internet even though the Internet was not considered in any
significant way in the deliberations leading up to article 4. Additional objections
to broad expansion of jurisdiction are familiar. There are traditional concerns
about notice, fairness, comity, and national sovereignty in expanding the reach
of European law to websites around the world. Stated differently, the jurisdiction-
enhancing interpretation of article 4 would have major extraterritorial effects.
Websites and others outside of Europe, who may not have taken any action to
seek business from European customers, would be expected to conform their
actions to the laws of distant countries.,0 7
3. Purchases in Person under Article 4
Analysis of some examples will help make the rules of article 4 more under-
standable. The first example is a credit card purchase in person. Assume the
following:
(1) the consumer is a French national living in France;
(2) the customer buys an item in Italy while on vacation; and
(3) the operations center for the credit card issuer is in England.
107. Even if judgments were not enforceable against website operators in the U.S., the individual
operators may be at risk of enforcement if they ever travel to Europe for business or on vacation,
a far-from-rare occurrence in this day and age.
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Under article 4, the first task is to identify the controller or controllers who
"alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data." 108 The first controller is the retailer in Italy. That retailer is
presumably established in Italy and would come under Italian data protection
law.'9 If the retailer is established in the territory of several Member States (such
as a Pan-European chain of stores), then necessary measures must be taken to
ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations laid down
by the applicable national law. "0 For instance, the retailer might have its head-
quarters and processing center in Germany. In such a case, the "narrowest fun-
nel" rule means that the retailer must apparently comply with both Italian and
German law for data arising from this transaction. By contrast, if an Italian
retailer contracts for a German company to process the data, only the Italian
law would apply. The German contractor would only be a processor and not a
controller, so article 4 would not call for application of German law.
A second controller is the credit card company with its headquarters and opera-
tions center in England. This credit card company receives a great deal of personal
information concerning transactions, and is a controller when it "determines the
purposes and means of the processing""' of such data. Because the company is
established in England, English data protection law would apply.
Notably absent in the analysis thus far is any role for French data protection
law with regards to this French consumer. Although French data protection
law would not appear to apply to this transaction,t '2 it is possible that other
consumer protection laws would apply. For instance, the credit card company
would likely have to comply with consumer laws concerning topics such as
interest rate disclosure.'' 3
Next consider a variation on this first example:
(1) the consumer is a French national living in France;
(2) the customer buys an item in Italy while on vacation;
(3) the operations center for the credit card issuer is in England; and
(4) the credit card company stores its English records in a mainframe in the
United States.
108. Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 2(d).
109. "Each Member State shall apply the national provisions . . . where: (a) the processing is
carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of
the Member State." Id. art. (4)(l)(a).
110. Id.
I11. Id. art. 2(d).
112. French law may apply in the billing process, if there is any entity established in France that
qualifies as a controller.
113. One wrinkle could make the analysis even more complicated. Suppose the consumer in
Italy purchased health-related products such as pharmaceuticals. Such a purchase would involve
"sensitive" data under article 8 and, as discussed above, member states retain the right to promulgate
especially strict rules for sensitive data. If Italy promulgated such rules for health-related data, it
might be illegal to transfer information about the transaction to England and France, or might require
special consent by the customer.
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In this variation, the question is whether data can lawfully be transferred to
the United States." 4 In brief, transfer is permitted if the United States or the
credit card sector in the United States is found to have "adequate" protection
of privacy. 15 If not, then the credit card company must fit within one of the
derogations in article 26. In this example, the company could get unambiguous
consent in advance from the consumer, probably including a notice that personal
information may be sent to countries that lack adequate protection of privacy.' 16
In the alternative, the credit card company in the United States could sign a
contract with the company in England, agreeing that the data in the United States
would be processed according to English data protection law. Transfers under
the contract would be lawful, if the English Data Protection Registrar approved
the contract. 117
4. Distance Selling under Article 4
The second example suggests some different legal issues that arise when the
consumer buys at a distance from the seller whether by mail-order, telephone,
or over the Internet. Assume the following:
(1) the consumer is a French national living in France; and
(2) the seller is in Spain.
The seller is a controller who is established in Spain. The obvious law that
applies here is Spanish data protection law. The question is to define the point
at which the seller is also established in France, triggering French data protection
law. For instance, there may be a telemarketer perched a mile inside Spain,
whose entire business is making sales calls into France. Recital nineteen to the
Directive provides modest guidance to the meaning of "establishment," stating
that "the legal form of such an establishment, whether simply branch or a subsid-
iary with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in this respect.""I,
8
This language suggests that the Spanish telemarketer may not be established in
France. On the other hand, in the course of delivering goods and services to
French customers, the telemarketer may take actions that "establish" it in France.
If so, then both French and Spanish data protection law would apply.
114. This question is considered at length in SwIRE & LITAN, supra note 8.
115. Directive 95/46, supra note 7, art. 25.
116. Id. art. 26(1).
117. Id. art. 26(2).
118. The full text of Recital 19 states:
Whereas establishment on the territory of a Member State implies the effective and
real exercise of activity through stable arrangements; whereas the legal form of such
an establishment, whether simply branch or a subsidiary with a legal personality, is
not the determining factor in this respect; whereas, when a single controller is estab-
lished on the territory of several Member States, particularly by means of subsidiaries,
he must ensure, in order to avoid any circumvention of national rules, that each of
the establishments fulfills the obligations imposed by the national law applicable to
its activities.
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A variation on the example is as follows:
(1) the consumer is a French national living in France; and
(2) the seller is in the United States.
This scenario is the one discussed at length above in connection with the possible
jurisdiction-enhancing effects of the Directive. If the controller is "established"
in France, then French data protection law would apply. If the controller is
not "established" in France, but comes under France's jurisdiction under usual
jurisdictional principles, then French data protection law would once again likely
apply. In such situations, where there is French jurisdiction, and the controller
"makes use of equipment" in France, then article 4 states that French data
protection rules shall apply.
The more controversial cases arise where the controller is not established in
France, and where territorial jurisdiction would not exist under usual jurisdic-
tional principles. In such circumstances, it is argued that article 4 should not apply,
but some European officials have claimed that article 4 itself grants jurisdiction. It
is possible that this dispute will ultimately be the subject of diplomatic discussions
between the European Union and other countries as part of a broader dialogue
about the scope of jurisdiction as applied to Internet transactions.
Apart from data protection law, the use of distance selling may trigger an
entirely different set of compliance issues for sellers. The European Union has
adopted a Distance Selling Directive that becomes effective on May 20, 2000."9
The Distance Selling Directive applies to organized sales efforts that use a means
of distance communication, including telephone, mail-order, or webpage. 2 0 De-
spite its wide application to Web sales and other distance selling, the Distance
Selling Directive has received very little attention to date.' 2' Perhaps most im-
portant to electronic commerce, the Distance Selling Directive grants the con-
sumer the right to withdraw from a distance contract for at least seven working
days without giving any reason and without penalty except for the cost of returning
the goods. '22 Although there are significant exceptions to this right of withdrawal,
a great many Web and other distance selling purchases are apparently covered. '
23
The Distance Selling Directive also has its own choice of law provision. After
119. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 9, art. 15.
120. The definitions of "distance contract" and "means of distance communication" are defined
in Distance Selling Directive, supra note 9, arts. 2(1) & 2(4). The covered means of communication
are listed in Annex I.
121. A LEXIS search in August 1998 revealed no law review articles that had cited the Distance
Selling Directive since its passage in 1997, and only three articles that mentioned it as a proposed
Directive.
122. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 9, art. 6(1).
123. Exceptions to the right of withdrawal include: goods which, by reason of their nature, cannot
be returned; unsealed audio or video recordings or computer software; and newspapers, periodicals,
and magazines. Id. art. 6(3). In addition, the Distance Selling Directive excludes categories of sales
including: financial services; goods sold at auction; immovable property; and to a limited degree,
foodstuffs. Id. art. 3.
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stating that the consumer may not waive the rights conferred under the Distance
Selling Directive, 24 it provides:
Member States shall take the measures needed to ensure that the consumer does not
lose the protection granted by this Directive by virtue of the choice of the law of a
non-member country as the law applicable to the contract if the latter has close connection
with the territory of one or more of the Member States. 25
In other words, EU consumers would apparently be offered the protection of
their home-country law, notwithstanding efforts by the seller to have a contract
that specifies the use of American or other non-EU law.
D. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE DIRECTIVE AND CHOICE OF LAW
The discussion of the Data Protection Directive highlights two themes for the
understanding of choice of law and the Internet: the uses and limits of harmoniza-
tion, and the leading role of transgovernmental regulatory networks rather than
courts.
The use of harmonization, which EU law sometimes refers to as "approxima-
tion,'1 26 is an important and obvious way to reduce conflicts among national
laws. Because so many modern transactions have a transnational component,
such harmonization can help satisfy the desire for simplicity and certainty in
commercial law. The Internet makes it increasingly easy and less expensive to
contact sellers in distant lands, making the advantages of harmonization even
more apparent.
Analysis of the Data Protection Directive, however, suggests some of the limits
of harmonization. As a practical matter, even within the European Union with
a Directive that expresses agreement on the basic rights to be protected, there
are multiple and important areas where national laws can differ. Part of the
variation might be explained by the ordinary political process of countries preserv-
ing the power to legislate on issues they consider important. Part of the variation,
however, arises from the fundamental principles that are called federalism in the
United States and subsidiarity in the European Union. Resolving issues at a more
local level has benefits, including the democratic advantages of local control,
the flexibility to adapt to local conditions, and the ability to experiment with
different solutions to common problems. Given the important and enduring values
of federalism and subsidiarity, there are inherent limits on the degree of harmoni-
zation. In a world where multiple sovereigns will often have territorial jurisdiction
over a transaction, choice of law issues will remain inevitable and even common.
A second theme from the analysis of the Data Protection Directive is the small
role played by the courts in its choice of law issues and the large role played by
124. See id. art. 12(1).
125. Id. art. 12(2).
126. Id. art. 1.
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what Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter calls "transgovernmental networks.- 1 27
Applied to privacy, this network describes the substantial interactions among the
privacy agencies in the fifteen European Union countries, together with interac-
tions among privacy officials, advocacy groups, regulated organizations, academ-
ics, and others around the world."2 8 Professor Slaughter's research emphasizes
the leading role played by regulators who have the same functional responsibilities
in different countries.
The choice of law regime of the Data Protection Directive reflects the primacy
of this sort of transgovernmental network. The Directive and its choice of law
rules were initially drafted and negotiated with large input from the privacy
agencies, but with little or no participation by courts. Over time, as discussed
previously, 12 9 the Working Party of privacy commissioners has played a leading
role in interpreting the Data Protection Directive. Under the Directive, national
decisions about the adequacy of privacy protection will be appealed to the article
31 committee, where votes are taken by political representatives of the Member
States. The European Court of Justice will not decide what countries have "ade-
quate" protection.
More broadly, Professor Patrick Borchers has documented the considerably
smaller role European courts play in jurisdictional issues as compared with U.S.
courts. 30 For privacy and electronic commerce, many choice of law disputes
may be resolved primarily within transgovernmental administrative networks
rather than courts. In the future, the international banking and securities regula-
tors, privacy regulators, or other regulators may agree among themselves which
country will take the lead in regulating particular sorts of transactions. The formal
and informal decisions within these networks may often deserve closer scrutiny
by those seeking to understand the choice of law regime rather than the occasional
choice of law decision by the courts.
III. Elephants, Mice, and the Legal Regulation of the Internet
Part II of this article discussed choice of law under the EU Data Protection
Directive and showed how European privacy laws might apply to a wide range
of transactions on the Internet, even for websites in the United States that do not
seek European customers. This concluding part of the article addresses the more
127. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183,
195. See also ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995).
128. I am currently involved in research, sponsored by the Berkman Center for Law and the
Internet of the Harvard Law School, concerning the transgovernmental network of privacy agencies.
129. Working Party, supra note 87.
130. Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the United States and the European
Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 121 (1992). Borchers finds the
European approach, based more on practical decisions about jurisdiction in specific areas, generally
preferable to the American approach, which he characterizes as based too much on judicial theories
of jurisdiction that are applied with little regard for specific context. Id.
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general question of when law is likely to be effective for Internet activity. A
critical change for the Internet will be the increase in situations where individuals
engage in international transactions themselves, rather than through import-export
companies or other intermediaries. As individuals themselves act internationally,
the overall style of legal regulation will differ substantially for "elephants" and
"mice." As one consequence, choice of law rules will be important with respect
to the former but not the latter.
A. THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL SALES TO INDIVIDUALS
In researching the book about the Data Protection Directive, one theme emerged
about what is critically different legal regulation of the Internet-far more than
before, individuals will routinely buy across national borders. To a surprising
extent, direct marketing currently has had only a small international component. '
3
'
True, transnational marketing has been more important for certain sectors, such
as travel services and some very high-end products. But the dominant reality
until now has been that individuals (except in border regions) quite rarely buy
directly from a seller in another country.
This lack of international sales to consumers has been accompanied by an
enormous growth overall in the level of international trade. Until now, interna-
tional trade has overwhelmingly featured business-to-business transactions.
Goods and services have generally been imported by businesses, and the ultimate
sale to individuals has been made by companies licensed to do business in the
consumer's country. Business-to-business sales will continue to increase rapidly
in the emerging world of electronic commerce. Indeed, in purely financial terms,
business-to-business sales over the Internet are much larger today than business-
to-individual sales, and this predominance will continue in the future. '32
Although business-to-business sales over the Internet are and will remain a
larger portion of Internet sales, the greatest legal and policy ferment will occur
for business-to-individual transactions. An important reason for this is that for
business-to-business sales there are existing commercial practices in place, includ-
ing bills of lading, letters of credit, and other accepted tools of international
transactions. International banks and other intermediaries are experienced at facil-
itating international trade. When disputes arise, businesses can appeal to national
laws and to a well-established system of commercial arbitration. In terms of
choice of law, business-to-business sales are largely governed by the law selected
by the parties under the authority of the Rome Convention, the United Nations
Convention on the Law Applicable to the International Sale of Goods, and estab-
lished legal precedents.
131. Swlm & LITAN, supra note 8, ch. 7.
132. Id. ch. 4.
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The situation changes substantially when a business sells to individual consum-
ers across national borders. European and American law often treat consumer
contracts differently from business-to-business contracts. In general, consumers
are not as able as businesses to waive their legal rights because of public policy
concerns about adhesion contracts and the unfair bargaining power of the seller.
As shown by both the Distance Selling Directive and the Data Protection Direc-
tive, consumer contracts are more likely to be subject to mandatory rules in
the consumer's jurisdiction, making it more difficult for the contract to specify
alternative choices of law. When disputes arise, there is no significant history
of international arbitration of a consumer's dispute with a merchant. If disputes
go to court, the process may be lengthy and expensive, and there is no certainty
that the judgment of one country (such as the consumer's) will be enforced in
the other country (such as the seller's).
In addition to these contract interpretation issues, other legal and policy prob-
lems multiply when international transactions are done with individuals rather
than businesses. Existing problems often become more acute and enforcement
far more difficult when international transactions involve millions of individuals
rather than thousands of businesses. Consider the sorts of social harms that are
likely to become more prominent as the Internet expands the ability of individuals
to access websites and conduct transactions in other countries. Individual coun-
tries will vary on which items on the list they consider to be social harms, but
every country has enacted laws forbidding at least some of the items listed below.
1. Privacy and Data Protection
The Internet creates the possibility of websites outside of Europe that can
process personal information about individuals in Europe. If there are no limits
on transfers of data to these sites, then data havens might develop outside of
Europe, filled with personal data about European citizens in violation of the goals
of the Data Protection Directive.
2. Consumer Protection Laws Generally
The Distance Selling Directive is one of many examples of a special legal
regime for consumer protection. Countries now have a host of other consumer
protection laws, covering topics such as: anti-fraud; proper advertising; usury
limits; regulation of installment contracts, rebates, and other specific selling
practices; and many more. There will be a growing demand to enforce these
sorts of laws internationally as more consumers do business on the Internet.
Enforcement will be especially difficult when the buyer and seller are not aware of
each other's nationality. Problems will also arise when the site sells downloadable
goods such as software, music, or information. In such instances, there are no
parties involved in physical shipment of the goods who are ready targets for
regulation.
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3. Professional Licensing
The Internet makes it far easier for an individual to purchase professional
services across borders. Examples might include legal advice, medical advice,
psychological counseling, and sales of financial services. Jurisdictions may find
it increasingly difficult to prevent outside persons from offering services without
a license.
4. Labor Laws
Similarly, the Internet makes it easier for employers to hire individuals in
distant countries, either full-time or on a contract basis. This sort of employment
might raise difficult legal issues both in the employer's country (e.g., laws against
hiring nonunion employees) and in the employee's country (e.g., laws that protect
employees, such as anti-discrimination and minimum wage laws).
5. Intellectual Property
As copying of valuable information becomes easier, for both small corporations
and individuals, the difficulty mounts for owners of intellectual property who wish
to control dissemination of that information. By contrast, owners of intellectual
property often can enforce more effectively where the purchasers are large corpo-
rations. One reason for easier enforcement is the risk that a disgruntled employee
will blow the whistle on an employer's large-scale violation of copyright or other
rules, at substantial expense to the employer.
6. Taxation
Today, international tax enforcement can focus on the relatively limited number
of businesses that engage in importing and exporting. In the future, over the
Internet, tax authorities fear they will not have any similarly effective way to
track international transactions involving a much larger number of sellers and
individual buyers.
7. Gambling
Countries vary widely in their approval of Internet gambling. It may be very
difficult for the anti-gambling countries to prevent their residents from gambling
at a site located in a country where the activity is legal.
8. Pornography
The Internet allows individuals around the world to access pornography, includ-
ing child pornography, that is forbidden in the individuals' home country. Coun-
tries that wish to restrict pornography will face great challenges in preventing
their residents from viewing material that is lawful in the country hosting the
site.
VOL. 32, NO. 4
INTERNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW AND THE INTERNET 1019
9. Hate Speech
Some countries, such as Germany, have strict rules forbidding certain forms
of hate speech, including Nazi propaganda. Such laws become much more difficult
to enforce if free speech protections in other countries allow posting of Nazi or
other material to the Internet.
10. Treasonable or Other Politically-Censored Speech
Some countries, such as Singapore and China, have laws forbidding certain
sorts of political speech. The Internet makes it more difficult for countries to
exclude such speech.
11. Digital Defamation
On the Internet, everyone can be a publisher. It becomes easy and cheap to
have a webpage that can be accessed from around the world. Some of these
webpages, perhaps many, contain malicious and untrue statements. Countries
will vary in what must be proved to establish a claim for defamation.
This list suggests the perplexing array of harms that might occur as individuals
gain the ability to visit websites from around the world. For many of these issues,
we can expect major disagreements among national legal regimes. A central issue
then becomes the extent to which a nation (or group of nations) can act effectively
to protect against the harms that it considers important.
B. ELEPHANTS AND MICE
In considering legal regulation of the Internet, there is an important distinction
between large players, which one might call "elephants," and small, mobile
actors called "mice." The style of regulation against elephants and mice differs
substantially. Elephants are large, powerful, and practically impossible to hide.
Consider a transnational corporation that has major operations in a country. If
that country has strict regulations, the corporation's actions will be highly visible,
and it may become an enforcement target if it flouts the law. At the same time,
elephants are enormously strong and have all sorts of effects on the local ecosystem
(potentially crushing trees, smaller animals, etc.). If a particular regulation angers
an elephant, it may have the ability to change the rule.
The situation is quite different for mice, which are small, nimble, and multiply
annoyingly quickly. 13  A good example on the Internet might be pornography
sites. A profitable site can establish itself quickly, perhaps using bootlegged
pictures that belong to other owners. If the site is shut down, the operator can
133. The metaphor of the mice was suggested in part by the "Stainless Steel Rat" series of novels
by Harry Harrison. These novels, set in the future, describe the intelligent hero as a "stainless steel
rat" who can move through the walls of high-technology society, violating the rules and evading
capture.
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simply open a new site, under a new name, and perhaps in a new jurisdiction. The
same pictures might be back on the Internet the same day. Would-be regulators can
run around furiously with a broom, but with little chance of getting rid of all
the mice.
The metaphor of elephants and mice helps explain what sorts of sites are most
subject to successful national regulation. Where the perceived harm is caused
by elephants, the country has an especially good chance to stop the harm. By
contrast, it will often be very difficult to stop perceived harms that are caused
by mice. Inventors will keep trying to devise a better mousetrap, but with little
hope of complete success. Drastic measures, such as using strong poisons, might
get rid of the mice, but such poisons may also kill some freedoms that are cher-
ished. A national ban on Internet access would stop the Internet harms, but it
would also stop all of the good things the Internet can provide.
Applying the metaphor to privacy, large processors of information are the
easiest elephants to identify. Examples include credit card companies, airline
reservation systems, telephone companies, and the human resource databases of
major companies. Even if they ship data to third countries, these firms typically
have large operations in Europe and are clearly subject to enforcement actions
there. Like elephants, these firms cannot hide-data protection authorities will
be on the lookout for big databases that lack adequate protection. On the other
hand, the elephants get undoubted advantages from their size. These sorts of
companies can afford to participate in lobbying on the Directive and the imple-
menting of national legislation. Like elephants, these companies also have a
thick skin-they can defend themselves vigorously and can afford to pay fines
if necessary.
This analysis suggests that national data protection rules might work reasonably
effectively where the data is primarily in the hands of the largest companies. If
few people outside of mainframe computer centers ever get access to the personal
data, then that sort of data can be well protected. Similarly, we would expect
the websites of elephants to comply relatively well with national laws and to
install relatively strict privacy policies. Failure to do so will predictably lead to
media and regulatory scrutiny.
At the other extreme, it will be extremely difficult for national regulators to
effectively govern data processing by the mice of the electronic world. Many
websites are run by individuals or small companies. A country may lack jurisdic-
tion over the website. Even if jurisdiction can be established, there may be no
effective way to identify or punish the wrongdoers. Individual users might reveal
personal information to such a site, perhaps due to a fraudulent promise to keep
information confidential or under the mistaken impression that the site will comply
with data protection laws. As each crumb of information is received, the mouse
might transfer the information to its favorite nest. Notably, databases filled with
these crumbs might develop in countries that lack privacy laws.
The metaphor of elephants and mice applies similarly to other items on the
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list above. Consider intellectual property. The elephants of the world will comply
at a relatively high level with copyright laws and other requirements. Large
companies, which do business in many countries, are subject to enforcement
actions if they break the rules. If an elephant is doing something it should not,
it can be very obvious. For instance, elephants that break copyright rules are
subject to retaliation (and expensive damages) from any employee who becomes
disgruntled and blows the whistle on the offending practice. 134 By contrast, mice
might find stealing more profitable than paying for their food. For many owners
of intellectual property, a crumb here or there is not worth the chase, especially
when the chances of catching the pest are so slight.
This analysis of intellectual property is borne out in practice. For software,
large companies routinely pay for site licenses while individual users are more
likely to pass bootleg copies amongst themselves. The biggest threat to content
providers is when their most valuable material is subject to easy copying by mice.
Examples include music companies and Playboy Magazine, which sell primarily
to individuals rather than large corporations that respect copyright rules. These
content providers seem to be at risk of being nibbled to death by mice. '35 In
response, these companies have taken vigorous action to close down websites
that violate their copyrights and have appealed to users not to patronize sites that
provide bootleg copies.' 36
What are countries to do when mice cause harm? Because it is so hard to find
and catch the mice, the focus of legal regulation predictably falls on other groups,
such as the users, Internet service providers, the payments system, or the offshore
countries that shelter the mice. First, a country can punish users. For example,
anyone caught gambling or accessing pornography can be punished. If a society
has a strong enough consensus against the particular behavior, then punishing
users may be legitimate. This approach does not work, however, for privacy
issues. It makes no sense to punish persons for giving their own personal informa-
tion to a website.
A second target can be the Internet Service Provider (ISP), who can be held
liable if the allegedly harmful material is accessed through its service. ISPs are
134. There are other reasons why large companies may comply more with intellectual property
rules than other companies. Large companies have in-house expertise in how to comply with such
rules, and know how to get permission to use other companies' intellectual property. Large companies
can afford to pay licensing fees. They also often own intellectual property of their own, and so have
a vested interest in the system of property rules.
135. I take no position on whether such a death would be desirable for Playboy or any other
content provider. I am simply describing the difficulty facing an owner of intellectual property that
is subject to widespread copying by small websites that are accessible world-wide. On the problems
facing producers of music CDs, see Jason Chervokas, Internet CD Copying Tests Music Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1998, at D3.
136. See e.g., Playboy v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Playboy v.
Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Playboy v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552
(M.D. Fla. 1993); Playboy v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1981).
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firmly rooted in the customer's locality, and so are subject to jurisdiction and
enforcement actions. Governments may thus find it overwhelmingly tempting
to regulate ISPs. There are reasons, however, to be extremely cautious before
instituting such regulation. Notably, harsh rules on ISPs may sharply increase
the price and reduce the access to the many good things on the Internet. In
addition, it is far from clear that ISPs have any effective ways to screen out bad
content while permitting good content. The poison set for mice may also kill our
favorite pets. And, even as the pets die off, new mice might emerge that are
resistant to the poison. Search engines will let individuals find the hidden bad
sites they seek. Mirror sites will let users get to bad sites that are supposedly
banned by the ISP. And clever editing on the bad sites will let the prohibited
words or pictures get through the ISP's filters (e.g., sites can take one letter out
of vulgar words that trigger the ISP's filters). Over time, filtering technology
may improve beyond its current crude state. Until it does, however, efforts to
regulate at the ISP level will often be a nasty combination of being both overbroad
and ineffective.
A third target for regulators can be the institutions that transfer money to the
website operators. Some annoying mice give away information for free over the
Web. Others, however, are vulnerable to the extent that regulators can stop the
consumer from paying the website operator. Suppose, for instance, that it became
illegal for a U.S. bank to transfer money on behalf of an individual, directly or
indirectly, to a gambling operation outside of the United States. While great
enforcement difficulties can be imagined, such a law illustrates how interruptions
in financial flows might cut off sustenance to mice.'37
A fourth target for regulators can be any offshore country that shelters the
mice. The business opportunities of a mouse are constrained in a country where
the activity is illegal-it is difficult and dangerous to become large and public
enough to attract customers while remaining small and hidden enough to avoid
the police. It is thus very tempting for mice to find a safe nest somewhere, such
as in an offshore country. And, it is consequently tempting for the United States
or other countries to exert pressure on the offshore haven. In the future, as a
wide array of countries try to take advantage of global telecommunications to
become offshore havens, we are likely to witness complex diplomatic maneuvers
involving onshore and offshore countries.' 38
137. If such a law were passed, the gambling operations would presumably try to hide their
identity, such as by having payment move through apparently "clean" front operations. Cutting off
payments to the gambling operations would then closely parallel cutting off payments to drug cartels
or others considered criminal by the onshore country. A chief goal of money laundering laws is to
make it difficult to transfer funds to front operations. I am currently researching the interaction of
money laundering laws, financial privacy, and the Internet.
138. For an illuminating discussion of tax havens and the countermeasures by fiscal authorities,
see CAROLINE DOGGART, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USES 113-34 (1997).
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C. ELEPHANTS, MICE, AND CHOICE OF LAW
The discussion here shows that legal regulation of Internet activity generally
will be possible against elephants in the sense that elephants cannot hide easily
and are usually subject to a country's jurisdiction. The possibility of enforcement
against elephants does not imply that regulation will always occur. Constraints
on regulation are likely as a matter of public choice theory, as the elephants use
their bulk and strength to participate in the political process and oppose burden-
some laws.'39 Constraints on enforcement will also come from elephants' thick
hides, as they deploy legal counsel, public relations professionals, and other
means to defend themselves in court and to otherwise discourage regulatory
action.
The style of legal regulation will be different for mice. Where harms over the
Internet are caused by mice, it will typically be difficult to identify the wrongdoers.
Legal rules will obviously apply against mice in the few instances where the
mice are actually caught. More often, however, regulation will focus on other
parties-the individuals who do business with the mice, the ISPs that connect
individuals to the mice, the payment intermediaries that transfer money to the
mice, and the offshore countries that give the mice shelter. Precisely because mice
can evade direct enforcement, nations will be tempted to try indirect enforcement.
The distinction between elephants and mice applies in a straightforward way
to choice of law. Simply put, choice of law matters a great deal for elephants
and usually not at all for mice. As defined here, elephants are large organizations
that often have assets and economic activities spread widely across states and
nations. When disputes arise, elephants will be subject to jurisdiction in various
places. The key legal questions will then become ones of choice of law-out
of the various jurisdictions that could apply their law to the elephant, which
jurisdiction's rules will apply?
Where elephants sell to businesses, the choice of law rules will typically come
from the Rome Convention, the CISG, and other existing sources of law. The
more divisive questions will arise in the growing number of transactions directly
between elephants and individual consumers. Within the United States' 40 there
is currently a contentious debate about choice of law rules in the proposed Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2B. Many business interests wish to give the seller or
licensor wide scope to select choice of law rules. In terms of the UCC debate,
they support giving effect to the "shrinkwrap" or "clickwrap" licenses that
139. Under standard public choice theory, small, rich, and well-organized groups are likely to be
especially effective in the political process. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1965) (discussing advantages accruing to groups where a small number of actors receive
the benefits of collective action).
140. Amelia H. Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing Applica-
ble Law and Forum Under Proposed Revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code, 32 INT'L LAW.
1067 (1998).
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are drafted by the licensor. In opposition, consumer advocates generally want
individuals to be covered by their state consumer protection laws. Looking for-
ward, one can predict similar debates at the international level. Large Internet
merchants will wish to have transactions governed by the rules of a single forum,
while individuals might expect to be protected by local consumer protection rules.
For transactions involving elephants, therefore, one can foresee a major role for
choice of law, both within the United States and internationally.
By contrast, choice of law will rarely be important for disputes arising from
the behavior of mice. It will generally be difficult or impossible to identify the
mice and bring them into court. Once identified, they will dispute jurisdiction.
Once adjudged responsible, they will hide assets out of the reach of courts. With
elephants, the problem is deciding which sovereign's rules will apply. With mice,
the issue more often will be whether any sovereign's rules will be effective. '
41
IV. Conclusion
The initial task of this article was to explore some ways that choice of law
would apply within the European Union and in transactions between the European
Union and the United States. The existing system of choice of law in international
transactions has largely concerned business-to-business transactions. Under the
Rome Convention and other existing law, where multiple countries would have
jurisdiction, businesses are given wide latitude to select the forum whose law
will apply if disputes arise under a contract. Similar latitude is likely to exist for
business-to-business transactions over the Internet.
The second task of the article was to examine the choice of law dimensions
of the Data Protection Directive, which became effective in October 1998. The
Data Protection Directive is especially relevant to the Internet because it seeks
to regulate so many flows of data over the Internet. Its limit on transborder data
flows is also an early example of the conflict that can arise as countries seek to
restrict activities on one part of the Internet that are legal elsewhere.
In studying the Data Protection Directive, the article explained why article 4
should not be read as a grant of jurisdiction over websites in the United States
and around the world. Study of the Data Protection Directive also helps reveal
two important lessons for the international choice of law regime. First, the Direc-
tive shows both the attraction of harmonization as a way to eliminate choice of
law problems and the limits of harmonization due to practical politics and the
141. There are circumstances where choice of law will matter to mice. Once an individual or
small enterprise is identified and found to be within the jurisdiction of a country, that sovereign may
indeed be able to apply civil or criminal penalties. An important choice of law problem can then
exist where the activity was legal in one jurisdiction (such as for an offshore gambling casino) but
was illegal in another jurisdiction (such as the onshore country). In such a situation, the onshore
country will have to choose whether to apply its own or foreign law. At least where the activity is
criminal in the onshore country, however, one might expect that country to select its own law.
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persisting attractions of federalism and subsidiarity. Second, the Directive illus-
trates the relatively contained role for the courts in international choice of law
compared to the large and growing role for transgovernmental networks of regula-
tory agencies who will often allocate national roles amongst themselves.
The third and most general task of this paper was to explore when legal regula-
tion of the Internet will be effective. The nature of the Internet does not pose
unique problems for enforcement against elephants. For the regulation of large
corporations, the limits will be ones of political will to pass legislation and enforce
it. By contrast, the nature of the Internet does pose new problems for the legal
regulation of mice, who are difficult to find and often hide outside of the country.
Because the Internet helps individuals conduct international transactions with
unparalleled ease, the harms caused by these far-off mice are potentially large.
Countries that cannot catch the mice themselves are thus tempted to enact laws
regulating other parties, such as individual consumers, ISPs, payment providers,
or other countries where the mice hide.
The metaphor of elephants and mice also instructs us on the future of interna-
tional choice of law and the Internet. Elephants are often subject to jurisdiction
in multiple countries. When disputes arise, the issue quickly becomes which
sovereign's rules will apply-the classic choice of law question. As international
sales to consumers become more prominent, choice of law disputes will often
arise between the seller's country and the individual's national consumer protec-
tion law. On the other hand, the legal regulation of mice will more rarely implicate
choice of law issues. The mice will disguise their identity, dispute jurisdiction,
and hide their assets from judgment. Only rarely will they emerge into the light
of open court to assert a defense based on choice of law.
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